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Abstract: Strategic and managemerial decision-making in an organization can have a crucial effect
for the whole entity; however, it rarely involves the organization’s employees evenly at the different
organizational levels. The result is—what is addressed in this paper as—the ostracism risk, namely
the risk accruing from the lack of satisfaction of underprivileged employees’ groups during the
decision-making process. The ostracism risk could jeopardize the organization’s integrity and
therefore requires effective treatment. This paper aims at verifying a conceptual approach, which is
proposed as a methodology for assessing the probability of organizational cooperation when deciding
under risk, thus minimizing ostracism risk. The proposed approach is based on organizational and
human resources management (HRM) theories and is contextualized for construction through the
understanding of systems theory. The proposed methodology presents a potential modelling via
game theory of a medium-sized construction company that is organized according to Mintzberg’s
organizational model. The utilization of the bounded Pareto distribution is presented as an approach
of the model’s probabilistic processing, and the potential for estimating the probabilities to adopt a
favorable cooperational decision is verified. The paper concludes with the reference to the next steps
required for the methodology’s validation and further improvement.
Keywords: risk analysis; game theory; decision-making; organization theory; Pareto principle
1. Introduction
Positive or negative outcomes of decisions regarding organizational structure, func-
tion, and coordination (e.g., corporate mergers), are affiliated with the so-called external
risk, which accrues from the decisions themselves and is distributed among the personnel
organizational components, influencing them accordingly [1]. However, “ostracism risk”
can be equally or even more critical than the external; “ostracism risk” is defined in this pa-
per as the risk accruing from the lack of satisfaction of possibly underprivileged constituent
personnel components (individuals or groups) during the process of the decision-making.
The ostracism risk, along with the outcomes of the external risk, can manifest into situ-
ations detrimental to the organizational integrity in the short-, medium- and long-term
(e.g., complaints, worsening job performance) [2]. On the contrary, even if the external
risk is critically maximized, effective cooperation among the personnel components of the
decision-making team could minimize the ostracism risk, since the responsibility for the
taken course of action and any positive or negative outcomes is more smoothly and evenly
diffused [3].
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the impacts of the occurrence of ostracism risk
have yet to be identified and assessed; in fact, the term as such is introduced for the first
time in the current study. Nevertheless, there have been efforts discussing other concepts
related to the same phenomenon. For example, Wach et al. based their research on the
theoretical concept of strategic consensus, which according to them, describes a group
decision-making process and participants’ belief that the outcome (i.e., decision) is right [4].
Sustainability 2021, 13, 6545. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13126545 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
Sustainability 2021, 13, 6545 2 of 20
The main benefits of strategic consensus are listed as increased organizational performance,
cohesiveness, shared mentality, and trust [4]. Although the negative outcome related to
the lack of strategic consensus can be easily identified (e.g., inefficient use of resources,
disengagement, high employee turnover), they concluded that there are mixed empirical
findings on the actual economic impact of the lack of strategic consensus [4].
Adler et al. described the organizational environment as “a networked structure of
agents exchanging knowledge to ensure efficiency by using internal resources to make
decisions” [5]. They acknowledged decision-making as a collective task and they pro-
posed a modelling of the agents participating in this task and an estimation of their total
competence for decision-making [5]. Although they referred to some successful examples
(yet none of them in the construction industry context) of decentralized decision-making
supported by autonomously organized teams of employees, they also did not present any
figures about economic impacts [5].
Lin and Wu stated that research on collaborative relationships in the construction
industry is dominated by network-based approaches that focus on measuring and estimat-
ing the networks’ critical parameters (e.g., density) [6]. However, this technical approach
leaves the non-measurable parameters of collaborative relationships in the process of
decision-making (e.g., interests of the collaborative parties) out of the context.
Simu and Lidelöw presented empirical research on the perceptions of middle man-
agers in construction companies on the relationship between operations strategies (e.g.,
resource-efficient, flow-efficient) and various fields of decision-making, such as standard-
ization, production planning, supply chain, performance measuring, etc. [7]. Although
they indirectly refer to several aspects that are affected by the organizational framework
wherein decision-making takes place, their analysis lacks any reference, even indirect, to
any kind of quantification of these effects.
The reviewed literature evidently indicates both the research interest on the organiza-
tional framework’s relation and impact to decision-making as well as the diverse directions
and perspectives followed in this course. Moreover, it reveals that despite the various
aspects affected positively or negatively depending on the existence or lack of certain
features and qualities, a clear quantification of these effects is largely lacking.
In this course of research, this paper investigates methodologically the probability of
organizational cooperation during decision-making under risk, considering the maximiza-
tion of individual, group and collective benefits, and the minimization of the ostracism
risk. An exemplar organization is modelled via game theory, used for the definition of the
distinct benefits and the illustration of the interactions among the decision-makers. The
organizational aspects of the model emanate from organizational and human resources
management (HRM) theories. The results taken from the said modelling are probabilisti-
cally processed using the bounded Pareto distribution. Thus, the methodology concludes
by estimating the probability of the adoption of a favorable cooperational solution.
First, the theoretical background of the proposed methodology is displayed. Secondly,
the research approach is summarily delineated. Then, the modelling of the exemplar
reference organization (in the form of an “ideal type” construction company) takes place.
Following is the probabilistic processing of the model and the derivation of the final results.
Finally, the conclusions concerning the proposed methodology are drawn, and propositions
for its further generalization, expansion, and improvement are mentioned.
2. Methodological Context
2.1. Organizational and Human Resources Management Theories
In the field of management, an organization is defined as a system of individuals
or parts cooperating and coordinated to promote the common completion of purposes,
achievement of targets, and production of results [8]. It is mainly characterized by its
said purposes; the coordination efforts among its parts; its specific activity systems; the
corresponding responsibilities, obligations, and hierarchies; its dependence on the human
factor within; and its interaction with the external environment [8]. These characteristics
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are important in organizational decision-making and action-taking, especially when the
decisions are largely under risk and alternative courses of action are considered, a most
frequent case especially for construction companies, on which this paper focuses.
Such characteristics are dynamic and can be partly or wholly changed throughout
the organizational operational existence, which is dynamic itself, fully influential to and
influenced by its internal and external conditions [9], particularly for construction com-
panies where business activities are largely human-dependent and extremely sensitive to
variations of the socioeconomic environment.
Several methodologies have been proposed to quantify, customize, measure, statisti-
cally analyze, and standardize these characteristics. However, the human factor remains
largely difficult to process, for a variety of reasons, spanning from psychological to char-
acterological, and for both high- and low-ranking employees [10]. HRM dictates that the
members of an organization should: (a) be active and substantial parts of it, considering
their individual benefits as extensions of the collective one [10,11], (b) be assisted in their
actions by the systematic receipt, storage, use, and retrieval of information [12], (c) orga-
nize themselves in targeted groups discretizing, studying and resolving certain parts of a
more extended project [13], and (d) hold definite organizational roles (not to be disturbed,
otherwise the organization itself is disturbed) with a certain degree of jurisdiction and
specialization [14]. HR structures in mature construction companies typically present all
the above characteristics, with the possible exception of the effective information system,
which is an asset that is still inconsistently found or even largely missing, especially for
small and medium companies (SMEs).
The human factor blends with certain aspects of the current organizational theories
that have formulated, among others, ways of discretization related to the organizational size
(large, medium, or small, depending on the corresponding market environment and size
of other organizations), legal form, and complexity [8]. However, the greatest part of the
respective literature emphasizes the criteria regarding the character of the organizational
objectives, and its defined paramount human resources components.
According to [8,15], and considering the relevant organizational objectives, ranking of
the corresponding management issues, and key beneficiaries, construction companies fall
in the category of enterprises, which aim at socially acceptable profitability. In this case,
the key beneficiaries are the owners, while the main managerial issue is profit. Socially
acceptable profitability is supposed to not only be earned legally and transparently, but
also not be offensive to the common sense of justice, ethics, and egalitarianism.
Concerning the paramount human resources component, the Mintzberg
framework [16–18], which is depicted in Figure 1, proposes that every organization, includ-
ing construction companies, consists of some or all of the five following groups, which
contain individuals with common organizational tasks and similar roles: the operating
core (OC) (mainly tasked with the procreation of the respective services and/or products);
the strategic apex (SA) (the highest level administrators, wholly responsible for the smooth
organizational operation); the intermediate level (IL) or middle line (the intermediate ad-
ministrators, actively linking the operating core to the strategic apex); the technostructure
(TS) (the analysts developing and implementing standardization procedures in the organi-
zational operations); and the support staff (SF) (the executives performing indirect tasks).
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Figure 1. Mintzberg’s organizational model reprinted with permission from ref. [19]. Copyright Year:
19 July 2011, Copyright Owner’s Name: Jean-Christophe Benoist.
Considering the prevalence of a group over the rest, organizations can be discretized
as [16–18]:
• Simply structured, with SA as the paramount group. They are usually small, without
standardized operational procedures, and strongly influenced by a single person or a
small group of general administrators (e.g., the founders of the organization).
Machine-bureaucratic, with TS as the paramount group. Appointed tasks in such
organizations are extremely specialized. The standardization of the organizational proce-
dures is extensive, and any workplace changes happen in a long-term plan. All decisions
are made by an administrative group.
• Professional-bureaucratic, with OC as the paramount group. The standardization of
the organizational procedures is extensive as well, albeit the employees are highly
specialized themselves and capable of demarcated self-acting.
• Divisionalized, with IL as the paramount group. They consist of distinctive groups
implementing certain production lines in a semiautonomous way, while the respective
administration is exclusively focused in large-magnitude decision-making.
• Ad hoc, with SF as the paramount group. They are not structurally standardized, and
function as organic models including team building among the employees and the
in-between coordination for project implementation.
A construction company can potentially take, according to its business model, any of
the above types or their combination. The importance of each type for the organizational
function itself and the interconnections among the constituent groups depends on each
unique organizational case.
2.2. Game Theory
Game theory (GT) focuses on the interrelationship and interconnection of decisions
made by different individuals or groups, where each one’s decision affects the rest [20].
Specifically, it represents a systematic way of researching and investigating the following
key aspects [20]: (a) the case study itself, noted as game, (b) the decision makers, noted
as players or agents, (c) the interactions of the agents’ decisions, (d) each agent’s strategy,
developed after the interpretation of the aforementioned interactions, and (e) the rationality
of the agents’ decisions (where it is factually considered that all agents will choose the
most beneficial—for them—strategy). In real-life situations, agents tend to act irrationally
(due to sentimental shifts, psychological patterns, peer pressure, and other reasons), which
is partially explained with the adaptation of Kripke’s theorem [21]. However, this is
smoothed out when groups (and not individuals) are considered as single agents (not to
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be mistaken for coalitions of individual players), due to internal group processes during
decision-making [22].
Cases with only one agent (single-person decisions) or too many of them (where each
individual’s decision effect upon the total system can be considered as infinitesimal) are not
games and the approach of the Delphi method is more suitable [23]. However, apart from
such extremes, extensive games with many agents can indeed exist, approached as lattices
(with the nodes being the agents and the edges in between the interactions) and resolved
following the survival-of-the-fittest rule and/or promoting agent cooperation [24,25].
There are various distinctive game types fitting a range of modelized problems,
such as the competitive and potentially competitive zero-sum games, the cooperative and
potentially cooperative non-zero-sum games (where Nash equilibria can exist), the dynamic
or sequential games, the repetitive games, and the coalition games [20,26]. Notable game
depictions are the strategic (matrixlike), the appositional, and the extendible [20].
Crucial in game formation is the concept of information, namely the system conditions
and parameters (e.g., the number of agents and their available strategies) [20]. Relatively
to how much of this information is known to the agents, games can be discretized as total-
or short-information ones [20,26]. Short-information games should not be mistaken for
the incomplete information sequential games, since incomplete information refers to the
lack of knowledge concerning the previous-step agents’ decisions and not to the general
systemic framework [26].
Increasingly important regarding decision-making is evolutionary GT, namely the GT
implementation in evolving populations [27]. Evolutionary GT focuses on the dynamics
and frequency of strategy shifts in constantly changing agent systems [28]. Although
affiliated with evolving populations, certain evolutionary GT research results can be applied
to all kinds of games. A particularly important case regards conditional cooperation and
states in which, when cooperative agents tend to agree in their opinion from the outset,
a small number of competitive agents is actually beneficial to this cooperation, as they
create (by the contradiction they impose) more time for the cooperative ones to properly
reconsider their options and reevaluate their strategy—although too many competitive
agents tend, indeed, to create confusing situations within the population [29].
Game theory is also used in conjunction with specified methodological frameworks of
decision-making (such as the VIKOR method). Although the results of distinct implemen-
tation cases may vary, in certain models the two approaches can complement each other,
resulting in unanimously admissible results [30].
3. Modelling, Analysis and Results
3.1. Modelling of the Exemplar Reference Organization (Construction Company)
The proposed methodological framework begins with the modelling of the construc-
tion company. This process involves two large categories of required information. The
first concerns the unique typical features of the company, which are normally used in
several classification schemes (e.g., size, activities, etc.). The second concerns the unique
inherent organizational attributes and dynamics, which are determined by hard to trace
and quantify factors (e.g., personal relations, human-equipment dependencies, etc.). Con-
sidering the insurmountable difficulties in collecting information in the second category
and given the goal of this research, which is the initial conceptualization and verification of
a methodological approach to minimize ostracism risk, it was decided not to adopt an ap-
proach of analysis based on the acquirement and processing of empirical data but, instead,
consider and model an exemplar reference organization by following the first part of the
“pattern marching” technique that qualitatively captures institutional logics—namely the
conception of an “ideal type” [31]. This approach allows the description and modelling of
an exemplar reference organization whose attributes correspond to the theoretical consider-
ations in Section 2 and at the same time are informed by the one-dimensional view of power
in [32] (since the conceptualization is embedded in the context of a single organization and
concerns the decision-making interactions between agents in that specific context) and the
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considerations on properly modelling the dimensions of multi-agent organizations in [33].
To bring all the aforementioned elements together, as well as frame the synthesis of the
constituent attributes of the exemplar reference organization, the paradigmatic approach
of systems theory is used [34]. With systems theory, the constituents are identified as
parts of a system, and their sum is taken to amount to less than the whole; therefore, an
understanding of the context in which the conceptualization takes place (in the current
case, the construction sector), is required [34].
Given the framing described above and the theoretical elements in Section 2, the
exemplar reference organization (an “ideal type” construction company) is conceptualized
to feature the following attributes:
• It will be an enterprise.
• Its legal form will be the one of S.A.
• It will be of medium size (±500 employees), avoiding the extreme market condi-
tions associated with very large or small organizations. The rest of the competitive
organizations are considered to be similarly sized.
• It will be private, avoiding practical restrictions inherent in public organizations (albeit
the private market is itself strictly definite in terms of the appointed legal, associative,
regulatory, conditional, and competitive framework).
• It will be a professional bureaucratic organization, with OC including, indicatively,
engineers of various disciplines, construction managers, site managers, financial and
administrative partners, technicians, and operative and labor workers. It will be
relatively formalized but also decentralized vertically and horizontally to provide
autonomy to OC professionals, and will use the standardization of skills as its prime
coordinating mechanism [18]. The top management of its SA will be relatively small,
and generally mutually cooperative with OC. However, in case of non-cooperation,
there will be adverse effects for both SA and OC [16,18]. There will also be relatively
few IL managers, generally oscillating between their support to SA and OC, and
somewhat assuming a more powerful position when OC does not support SA [17]. TS
will be restricted in size, with its support to the rest of the organizational groups mainly
influenced by whether they disturb the procedural standardization it promotes [16].
Finally, SF will be typically large, providing clerical and maintenance support for OC
and being largely influenced by it [18]. Despite its size, though, its own influence on
the actions of the rest of the groups will be relatively weak [16–18].
• There will be no legal department, with any occurring instances being appointed to
an external legal firm.
• It will abide organizationally to the Likert consultative model ([35,36], where there
is partial communication (mainly of the consultative type) and group work in both
the horizontal and the vertical hierarchical axes. Its motivation system will consist
mainly of work reciprocation and the acknowledgement of the degree of involvement
during the decision-making. However, in the said degree of involvement of the lower
managerial levels, a more generous approach than the one of the classic consultative
model is hereby attempted. Recent research on business economics has postulated that
a stakeholder system of corporate governance relying on a cooperation between man-
agers and employees has the potential to enhance long-term firm performance [37].
Particularly, it is considered that a robust employee representation on the board of
directors, in an approximate 43% of the total number of the board participants, is ben-
eficial [37]. This percentage is largely optimal [37], and although it emanated from the
comparison between the allocation of the employees’ representation and the Tobin’s Q
coefficient (regarding, mainly, companies with vast share capital), it can be generalized
and associated with all sorts of organizational performance indicators [37,38]. In
praxis, the optimal percentage of 43% is not often found, but real case companies in
e.g., Germany and Japan, are reportedly reserving more than a third of the board
seats for employees’ representatives [37]. This can lead to 43% being considered as
achievable and in any case suitable for a conceptual modelling of an “ideal type” of
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organization, as is the case with the current study. Moreover, as such representatives
can belong to various organizational groups and hierarchical levels [37], and follow-
ing the denomination of the conceptualized construction company as a professional
bureaucratic organization, it can be considered that most employee board members
will belong to the OC, and fewer to the TS, IL, and SF. Additionally, the diffusion of
responsibility among the employees is significant, due not only to the optimal repre-
sentation percentage, but also to Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB), i.e., the
behavior apparent in employees caring and striving for the collective organizational
benefit [39]—where the employees will not only complete their appointed tasks in
the most effective way, but also work beyond their formal professional obligations,
for the benefit of the whole organization [40]. It should be noted, though, that the
described consultative model is not generous to the degree that it can be generalized
to the participatory model [35,36].
• Its strategy will be both innovational and oriented to cost minimization, as aligned
with strategy-oriented insights in [4,7,41,42] for firms either explicitly identified as
construction companies or largely having characteristics adjacent to the modelling
attributes of the exemplar “ideal type” construction firm conceptualized here. The
organizational structures will be medium-to-highly concentrated and the degree of
control quite strict. Task discretization and the degree of standardization will be
high—allowing, however, demarcated self-acting.
• The external market environment will be moderately stable, complex, and specific.
• Its structure will be amplitudinal, featuring high employee specialization, responsibil-
ity diffusion among the lower managerial levels, extensive control range, and fewer
managerial levels [8].
• It will be, structurally, quite decentralized. Decision-making responsibilities will
be diffused among the hierarchical ranks, and certain administrative nodes will be
preferred instead of many intermediate managerial levels. Such decentralization is
positively associated with the presence of lower managerial levels in the organiza-
tional structure, and indifferently or slightly negatively associated with the respective
presence of higher managerial levels [36].
• Its most specialized employees, such as the engineers, will be able to organize into
individual targeted groups undertaking certain aspects of a broader project [13].
• It will feature a distinguished and constantly updated information system, available
to all employees [12]. The system will be partitioned into three distinctive information
management stages, namely the exchange of information, its conception, and its use
into creating value [43]. The criteria defining the partitioning are associated with the
organizational Information and Communications Technology (ICT) background, its
socio-technological dimension, its focus on lifecycle, and its perspective of generating
and utilizing knowledge and information [43].
• Its corporate culture will promote neutrality, rationality, and minimized emotional and
psychological interventions while deciding under risk, thus achieving the most effec-
tive approach to decision-making [44]. It will also favor cooperation, communication,
and advantageous interaction among employees, as this improves the collaborative
risk perception [45]. Finally, it will promote legitimate courses of action, rejecting im-
moral, parasitic, and rent-seeking behaviors, thus ensuring the absence of corruption
in all internal and external organizational aspects [46].
• Employee training and knowledge updating will be continuous, brought about by
specific quality consultants in accordance to the Total Quality principles [47].
• Its most specialized employees will be able to use wikis, BIM (Building Information
Modelling), and other applications to optimize their cooperation, knowledge exchange
and innovation [48]. The utilization of such applications requires clear usage purpose;
collaborative culture; knowledge and information management capability; process
standardization; and clear managerial intension [48].
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Regarding the context, the synthesis (through a systems theory understanding) of
the aforementioned attributes can be considered to represent the “ideal type” of a typical
medium-sized construction company that could be found in a number of different con-
struction sectors, despite the corresponding specificities of each sector—e.g., within the
industry of the United States [49] or even developing countries [50].
The developed model can be generalized and is not restricted by special conditions,
apart from those defined by the given theoretical framework.
3.2. Non-Zero-Sum Game of the Organizational Decision-Making under Risk
Having stated the characteristics of the exemplar organization, the GT modelling of
its decision-making under risk will take place. This will be the first step for the calculation
of the probability of organizational cooperation in the perspective of a decision under risk,
considering both the maximization of individual, group and collective benefits and the
minimization of the ostracism risk. A total of N = 5 agents is considered, with each i ∈ N
representing a Mintzberg group: SA, OC, IL, TS, and SF. The main game attributes are
the following:
• The agents interact through their strategic actions, and their choices are rational [20].
Rationality is empowered due to the agents being groups and not individuals [22].
• It will be a potentially cooperative, classic, finite, single-round, non-dynamic, non-
sequential, non-repetitive, non-coalition, and non-zero-sum game [20,26], where Nash
equilibria may exist but will not be highlighted, as this is not the purpose of the
present modelling.
• It will be a complete information game, since all its conditions and parameters will be
known and accessible to all agents. The context, framework, and transport of the said
information are considered to not be influenced by common dilemmas [51].
• Resulting from OCB, agents are expected to try to seek the maximum total organiza-
tional benefit.
• The feasibility of cooperation among the agents generally depends on their number,
individual benefits following their strategic choices, and intention to possibly change
their strategy [52]. Since the present game includes a fixed agent number and is
non-dynamic and non-sequential (i.e., the agents cannot change their strategy during
the game), cooperation will mainly depend on the individual benefits. However,
cooperation is favored by the adequate communication among the agents (which
improves the risk perception), and the existence of institutional incentives (which
promote OCB) [53].
• Any decisions concerning the organization are not only made by the SA, since em-
ployee representation is set to the optimal 43% of the board members [37].
The ascending agent benefit scale P = {1, 2, . . . , 9} is defined, where 1 indicates the
least possible satisfaction, 5 a medium satisfaction level (equal to the existing satisfaction
prior the decision under risk), and 9 the maximum egoistic satisfaction. As far as the
egoistic benefits are concerned, taking the decision under risk is more beneficial for the
SA (since risk aversion is not considered to be a leading attribute and can culminate, in
some cases, into organizational decline) [44]—whereas IL, TS, OC, and SF will mostly be
medially satisfied, with OC and SF depicting a descending proclivity. Such satisfaction
levels can be modified, depending on the strategic decisions of the agents (along with any
concessions among them). For the definition of P, both quantitative (e.g., monetary profit
or cost) and qualitative (e.g., working posterity and satisfaction in the workplace) criteria
were considered, influencing both job performance and risk behavior.
The maximum egoistic benefit for each agent can appear when all other agents’ benefits
are lower than the said benefit. For example, SA will receive the maximum egoistic
benefit if it imposes its opinion and makes the decision under risk without conceding
towards the demands and claims of the other groups and, subsequently, of the whole
organization. Such a behavior, though, violates the pursuance of OCB, which supports the
conviction that individual benefits should imply the maximization of the organizational
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benefit. Nonetheless, OCB should not lead to injustice towards certain agents “for the
common good”.
Taking the aforementioned into consideration, it is necessary to connect all individual
benefits to the single collective one and consider that the latter is only achieved when all
agents receive at least a certain minimum but still sufficient level of satisfaction. For the
present model, it is assumed that the minimum acceptable collective benefit sums up to
30 and is achieved when each of the 5 individual ones is at least equal to 6 on the P scale
(meaning that the corresponding agents are at least modestly benefited after the decision-
making in an ascending manner). All interactions and correlations between the agents are
defined in a way that no sum can be equal to 30 when there is even one individual benefit
less than 6.
As far as the decision under risk itself is concerned, the agents have two options:
to approve (AP) or disapprove (DSP) of it, thus favoring risk acceptance or aversion.
Resulting is the set of strategies S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm}, m = 25 = 32. Each agent’s dominant
strategies (denoted as Si*) are considered the ones posing the maximum egoistical benefit.
All strategies appear only once, but the benefit combination of some can be similar to that
of others.
With the framework of the game outlined as above, it is possible to set the game itself
with the strategic representation of Figure 2 (see next page).
Figure 2. Matrix representation of the modelled game for organizational groups in decision-making.
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The benefits are appointed to the corresponding agents relatively to the defined
theoretical framework and the agents’ expectations and incentives, and they are direct. For
such an appointing, the following conceptual rules were followed through—with some
flexibility, depending on the specificities of each case as described in the commentary that
follows right after:
• Full cooperation on approval generates benefits greater than the medium level for all
agents, which are largely equal.
• Full cooperation on disapproval generates benefits greater than the medium level for
all agents, which, however, can be unequal relative to the strength and positioning of
each agent.
• Disagreement between strong agents generally generates a high benefit for the ones
cooperating with most of the rest of the agents, and a benefit around the medium level
or slightly lower for the non-cooperative ones.
• Disagreement between weak agents generally generates a high benefit for the ones
cooperating with most of the strongest agents, and a low benefit for the ones siding
with other relatively weak agents.
• Isolation of strong agents results in corresponding benefits around the medium level
or slightly lower. The benefits for the rest of the agents depend not only on their
clustered cooperation, but also their relative position to the isolated strong agent.
• Isolation of weak agents results in severely low corresponding benefits. The benefits
for the rest of the agents depend mainly on their clustered cooperation, and only
partially on their relative position to the isolated weak agent.
In time, the in-organization correlations and, consequently, the corresponding benefits,
may change. This is increasingly important when it comes to large egoistic benefits of
certain agents (and the corresponding minimized benefits of others), because in such cases
there may be long-term skirmishes and degraded situations among them, leading to loss
even for the groups that were initially (and egoistically) largely benefited.
In the following, a commentary on each of the possibly chosen strategies (considering
the agent order SA, OC, IL, TS, and SF in the delineation of benefits) will take place.
3.2.1. Case S1 = {AP,AP,AP,AP,AP} = (7,7,7,7,7) (sum: 35)
When everyone agrees to AP, there is full cooperation. For this to happen, SA will have
to bestow privileges upon the other agents, thus somewhat reducing its individual benefit
(which is still large). OC, being the paramount group, is equally benefited, as well as IL and
SF, which are similarly interconnected with SA and OC (SF is closer to OC and IL closer to
SA). TS is also equally benefited, even though a decision under risk could be destabilizing,
to some extent, to the organizational prototyping implemented by its analysts.
3.2.2. Case S2 = {AP,DSP,AP,AP,AP} = (8,4,6,6,4) (sum: 28)
When OC disapproves and everyone else approves, its benefit collapses under the
medium level of satisfaction. SF is drifted along OC, in spite of agreeing with the rest,
because it is strongly interconnected with OC. The direct egoistical benefit of SA is large,
since it has no interest in earning the cooperation of OC and does not bestow any privileges
upon it. IL earns a modest benefit, not being too large due to the non-cooperation of OC.
TS is granted an equally modest benefit and is not directly affected by the reluctance of OC.
3.2.3. Cases S3 = {DSP,AP,AP,AP,AP} = (5,8,6,5,5) and S30 = {AP,DSP,DSP,DSP,DSP} =
(5,8,6,5,5) (sum: 29)
When SA is solely disagreeing with the rest of the agents, its benefit is only medium,
but not lower in any case. OC acts as the main pressure group, enforcing its opinion, and
is largely benefited. IL takes advantage of the pressure imposed by the OC and is also
benefited. However, its benefit is not as large, because it is also closely interconnected to
SA. With SA and OC being in adversity, SF and TC are largely caught in the middle and
their benefits are mediocre.
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3.2.4. Cases S4 = {DSP,DSP,AP,AP,AP} = (5,5,5,5,4) and S29 = {AP,AP,DSP,DSP,DSP} =
(5,5,5,5,4) (sum: 24)
When SA and OC agree and the rest disagree with them, then their individual benefits
are mediocre. Their mutual opinions and benefits are strongly influential to the benefits
of the disagreeing agents and reduce them around the medium level as well. Albeit, SF
is the one that suffers the greatest loss, as it is heavily influenced by both SA and OC
(mainly OC).
3.2.5. Cases S5 = {AP,AP,DSP,AP,AP} = (7,6,4,7,5) and S28 = {DSP,DSP,AP,DSP,DSP} =
(7,6,4,7,5) (sum: 29)
When IL disagrees with the rest, it suffers significant loss. The largest benefit is equally
granted to SA and TS, with SA not surpassing TS because it lacks support on the part of IL.
TS is instead primed for the same reason. OC is modestly benefited, as it is influenced by
its disagreement with IL. SF is not directly influenced by the relative commotion and its
benefit sticks to the medium level.
3.2.6. Cases S6 = {AP,DSP,DSP,AP,AP} = (7,4,5,7,5) and S27 = {DSP,AP,AP,DSP,DSP} =
(7,4,5,7,5) (sum: 28)
In these cases, TS is equally benefited to SA. This happens because, not being sup-
ported by either OC or IL, SA is forced to bestow considerable privileges on TS to earn its
support. The benefit of OC is greatly decreased, and the one of IL is medium because it is
similarly interconnected to SA and OC. SF, while agreeing with SA and TS, is also granted
with a medium benefit, because it is heavily influenced by the disagreeing OC.
3.2.7. Cases S7 = {DSP,AP,DSP,AP,AP} = (6,4,6,5,3) and S26 = {AP,DSP,AP,DSP,DSP} =
(6,4,6,5,3) (sum: 24)
The agreement between OC, TS, and SF is not highly beneficial for them, since OC,
although strongly influential, has only managed to side with the two less dominant groups.
The situation is extremely unfavorable to SF, largely unfavorable to OC, and mediocrely
favorable to TS, which is more resistant to benefit ups-and-downs. The benefits of SA and
IL, favored by their cooperation, are modestly increased.
3.2.8. Cases S8 = {DSP,DSP,DSP,AP,AP} = (7,7,7,6,6) and S25 = {AP,AP,AP,DSP,DSP} =
(7,7,7,6,6) (sum: 33)
When SA, OC, and IL agree, they form a strong cooperative cluster and are equally
granted with increased benefits. TS and SF, although both disagreeing with the above
agents, are also modestly benefited instead of suffering avail losses, because both OC and
IL partly prime them.
3.2.9. Cases S9 = {AP,AP,AP,DSP,AP} = (7,7,7,6,8) and S24 = {DSP,DSP,DSP,AP,DSP} =
(7,7,7,6,8) (sum: 35)
The cooperative cluster of the immediately prior cases is furtherly reinforced by SF.
The benefit of SF is the largest among the four agreeing agents, since SF favors and is
favored by the three more dominant agents and opposes TS, which is opposed to the loose
structure typically favored by SF.
3.2.10. Cases S10 = {AP,DSP,AP,DSP,AP} = (6,4,6,5,6) and S23 = {DSP,AP,DSP,AP,DSP} =
(6,4,6,5,6) (sum: 27)
In these cases, SA cooperates with IL and SF. However, without the support of OC,
their benefits are only modestly increased. OC, on the other hand, suffers significant
decrease to its benefit, due to its opposition to SA and IL, and its cooperation only with TS.
TS itself experiences no benefit variance.
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3.2.11. Cases S11 = {DSP,AP,AP,DSP,AP} = (5,6,7,5,6) and S22 = {AP,DSP,DSP,AP,DSP} =
(5,6,7,5,6) (sum: 29)
Since IL opposes SA, it assumes a somewhat leading role in the cooperative cluster
among itself, OC and SF—although OC remains the most influential agent. This informal
leadership grants IL with increased benefit, whereas the rest of the three cooperating agents
are modestly benefited. SA, on the other hand, is stuck in the medium level of satisfaction.
So is TS, mainly because a less dominant and strict TS individually favors the empowered
and cooperating IL and SF.
3.2.12. Cases S12 = {DSP,DSP,AP,DSP,AP} = (6,7,5,6,5) and S21 = {AP,AP,DSP,AP,DSP} =
(6,7,5,6,5) (sum: 29)
In these cases, OC is able to impose its opinion to the agents it cooperates with and be
granted with increased benefit. SA and TS also benefit, but only modestly. The coalition of
IL and SF, on the other hand, can prevent heavy benefit losses, but their opposition to the
more dominant OC and SA also keeps their benefits around the medium level.
3.2.13. Cases S13 = {AP,AP,AP,AP,DSP} = (7,7,8,5,2) and S20 = {DSP,DSP,DSP,DSP,AP} =
(7,7,8,5,2) (sum: 29)
When SF is solely disagreeing with the rest, its benefit is decreased closely to the utmost
minimum, as it is the weakest agent. IL imposes its demands (partly to counterbalance the
defection of SF, however weak it may be) over SA and OC and benefits even more than SA
and OC. TS, although being a member of the four-part cooperative cluster, is negatively
affected by the imposition of IL and its benefit is mediocre.
3.2.14. Cases S14 = {AP,DSP,AP,AP,DSP} = (7,5,6,6,3) and S19 = {DSP,AP,DSP,DSP,AP} =
(7,5,6,6,3) (sum: 27)
OC, cooperating only with SF, does not benefit. SF is severely affected by its opposition
to SA, IL, and TS, and its benefit is only slightly increased relative to the immediately prior
cases, due to the support of OC. Without the cooperative influence of OC, SA imposes its
opinion upon IL and TS, and its benefit surpasses theirs.
3.2.15. Cases S15 = {DSP,AP,AP,AP,DSP} = (5,7,6,6,4) and S18 = {AP,DSP,DSP,DSP,AP} =
(5,7,6,6,4) (sum: 28)
OC is relatively imposing itself over IL and TS, its benefit surpassing the modest
ones of the other two. SA is only mediocrely benefited, and the benefit of SF is below the
medium level, being slightly increased relative to the immediately prior cases, due to the
support of SA. This increase, however, is not that significant, since SF is opposing OC.
3.2.16. Cases S16 = {DSP,DSP,AP,AP,DSP} = (7,7,4,5,6) and S17 = {AP,AP,DSP,DSP,AP} =
(7,7,4,5,6) (sum: 29)
SA and OC are largely benefited. SF is only modestly benefited, because although it
cooperates with SA and OC, its influence is relatively weak regarding its benefit demands.
The benefit of TS remains stagnant and the one of IL is decreased, since it opposes SF and,
principally, OC and SA. Cooperation between TS and IL gives rather poor results, since the
interconnection between them is weaker than the one between other agents (e.g., between
SA and IL).
3.2.17. Case S31 = {DSP,AP,DSP,DSP,DSP} = (7,4,6,6,4) (sum: 27)
This case is quite similar to S2 = {AP,DSP,AP,AP,AP}. The benefits are similar, too,
except for the one granted to SA, which is slightly lower than the corresponding one in S2.
This is due to the risk aversion highlighted in the disapproval of the decision under risk,
which can possibly lead to a waste of profit opportunity, primarily affecting SA.
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3.2.18. Case S32 = {DSP,DSP,DSP,DSP,DSP} = (6,6,6,8,6) (sum: 32)
In the universal disapproval of the decision under risk, there is full cooperation, such
as S1. However, the individual benefits are different. SA, OC, IL, and SF are only modestly
benefited, whereas the benefit of TS is largely increased, because of not only the successful
cooperation with the rest of the agents but also of the unanimous risk aversion, which
means—among other things—that the standard and modelled organizational structures
will probably remain fundamentally unchanged.
3.2.19. Discussion on the Case Commentary
Seconding the delineated justification of the model results, the following point can be
made:
• The agents’ dominant strategies are, respectively, S*SA = S2 = (8,4,6,6,4) (sum: 28),
S*OC = S3 = S30 = (5,8,6,5,5) (sum: 29), S*IL = S13 = S20 = (7,7,8,5,2) (sum: 29),
S*TS = S32 = (6,6,6,8,6) (sum: 32) and S*SF = S9 = S24 = (7,7,7,6,8) (sum: 35). The ones of
SA, OC, and IL entail that there will be certain agents with no satisfactory benefits. On
the contrary, the ones of TS and SF include benefits ≥6 on the benefit scale P, where 6
is the minimum acceptable individual benefit. Only S*TS and S*SF sum up to more
than 30 (the minimum defined collective benefit), and thus only these 2 are included
in the set of the preferable cooperative strategies processed in the methodology’s
next application step. The less favoring of cooperation when SA, OC, and IL are
respectively dominant emanates from the power and influence of those groups (with
OC being the most prominent and accommodating professionals potentially ranging
from designers and structural engineers to supply chain facilitators and site managers).
When any of those is dominant, its power largely cannot be cooperatively controlled
by the rest. On the other hand, TS and SF, much less influential, become dominant
only when the rest of the agents are at least modestly benefited.
• The extreme ends of P, 1, and 9, did not appear in any case. It was considered that
such individual benefits of even the less prominent agents, are not in line with certain
attributes of the exemplar reference organization—namely, its generous Likert consul-
tative model, decentralized and amplitudinal structure, elements of its organizational
culture, and OCB. Such extremities granting immediate benefits but being unsustain-
able in the long run for the described “ideal type” construction company can be, in
the case of e.g., the SA, an extreme form of strategic retrenchment in the face of the
COVID-19 pandemic [41].
• SA can never be granted with a benefit less than the mediocre 5. Representing a total
57% of the participants in the board of directors, it is highly unlikely that it would
allow decisions that it considers too unfavorable (e.g., relinquishing power to the
middle managers of IL or the site managers of OC). In most cases where SA is isolated
or sides only with TS and/or SF, it is mediocrely benefited. In all the rest, it is generally
benefited at least modestly.
• OC, being the paramount group, is greatly influential in cooperative clusters includ-
ing three or more agents, where its individual benefit is increased, and the rest of
the cooperating agents are benefited at least modestly. OC influences SF in a way
preventing it from being satisfactorily, or even mediocrely, benefited, when they do
not cooperate. The highest non-egoistic benefits of OC appear when it cooperates at
least with SA and/or IL (thus aligning itself with upper and/or middle management).
Such a cooperation can be achieved in, e.g., the case of innovation investments for
updating the digital technologies used in construction planning. When isolated, it is
never granted with less than 4 on the P scale.
• IL is equally influenced by SA and OC and its benefit is linked to theirs. There are
cases where a non-beneficial for SA situation empowers IL, which assumes profound
hierarchical power, and others where the loss of SA leads to similar loss for IL, due to
their failed cooperation. This flexibility in the positioning of IL between SA and OC in
construction companies can be considered to reflect the mediating role assumed by the
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respective middle managers in several contexts, e.g., in Denmark and the UK [42], or
Sweden [7]. When it comes to the rest of the Mintzberg groups, any empowerment of
TS is not considered favorable towards IL, because TS largely seeks to impose machine
bureaucratic organizational procedures, possibly removing privileges from the IL
operators. SF does not generally affect IL.
• TS, following the attributes of its default role, is largely benefited around the medium
level, with little diversification. It is generally more benefited when participating in
DSP-oriented cooperative clusters, due to the cooperation itself and, also, to the risk
aversion inherent in DSP. Such risk aversion is generally translated into little or no
alteration of the standardized procedures favored by TS. In private rather than public
entrepreneurial organizations, such as the currently modelled construction company,
TS is generally not as dominant; for example, see the study on Swedish site managers
retaining their professional freedom and independence against standardization proce-
dures being implemented during production [54]. As such, TS does not significantly
perturb the equilibria among the other organizational groups.
• SF, although greater in terms of representation relatively to TS, is considered the
weakest group in a professional bureaucratic organization, something also affecting
its benefits. When isolated, it is meagerly benefited. In most cases, OC strongly and
positively influences SF. On the other hand, SF is generally benefited inversely to IL.
SA is also greatly influential to SF, although less than OC and IL. TS is mostly neutral
to SF, although slight TS benefit increases can lead to slight SF benefit decreases and
vice versa.
• When cooperative clusters are formed and immediate benefits are at least modest, it
is considered that medium- and long-term benefits will also be satisfactory. On the
other hand, groups initially benefited too favorably or too severely are considered to
cause destabilizing medium- and long-term situations due to, respectively, the protest
of the rest against them for being too benefited, or their own protest when being too
underprivileged; however, the rate of entropy caused by a group is proportional to
its influence.
• Extended or full cooperation between, at least, the most empowered of the agents
(e.g., in the case of large project portfolios or in order to support joint ventures with
other construction and/or engineering companies), resulted in overall satisfactory
individual and collective benefits. On the contrary, disagreements and dispersion
of views were mostly considered to result in egoistic benefits and overall low levels
of satisfaction.
• The increased individual benefits and the subsequent large collective benefit in coop-
eration cases are in order with the organizational approach favoring OCB. Such an
approach does not exclude possible egoistic behaviors from time to time; however,
in its framework the cooperative agents choose their course of action with seldom
egoistic outbreaks.
Having shown the way to analyze the roles and behaviors of the various agents
in decision-making in an organization, the probabilistic processing with the use of the
bounded Pareto distribution follows.
3.3. Probabilistic Processing of the Model and Final Results
The external risk can be translated into monetary profit or loss, betterment or tar-
nishing of corporate reputation, and so on. However, it is the ostracism risk, accruing
from the benefit allocation in the game set earlier, that will be processed probabilistically
in the current section. The ostracism risk can result in short-, medium-, and long-term
destabilizing situations inside the organization, caused by the dissatisfaction of the most
underprivileged agents due to unfavorable benefit bestowal during the decision-making.
Such unfavorable benefit allocation mainly occurs when a group is isolated and denies or
is denied cooperation with at least some of the rest of the groups. Lack of cooperation, dis-
persion of views and large benefit diversity during the decision-making can lead to severe
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ostracism risk, no matter whether the decision proves beneficial or damaging regarding
the external risk. It is presupposed that all agents are fully responsible for their choices,
without responsibility withdrawal on their end, should the outcome of their decisions
prove damaging.
Important to cooperative decision-making is the probability of such a cooperation.
Although each strategy appears 1 in 32 times in the devised model (despite the individual
and collective benefits being 2 by 2 identical in most cases), the probability of decision-
making with a collective benefit summing up at least to 30, follows a power law probability
distribution—and, particularly, the bounded Pareto distribution.
The Pareto principle (also known as the 80-20 rule) states that in many cases, grossly
80% of the effects result from 20% of the causes [55]. It is widely used in numerous scientific
fields and has been empirically observed as suitable for a wide range of natural, social,
financial [56], and entrepreneurial [55,57] phenomena. Mathematically, the 80-20 rule is a
special case of the Pareto power law distribution. It is a rule: (a) persistent, as 80% of the
previous 80% of the effects is the result of 20% of the previous 20% of the causes [55], and
(b) symmetric, meaning that if 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes, then the
remaining 20% of the effects comes from the remaining 80% of the causes [55]. Being an
illustration of a power law relationship and due to its self-similarity [58] over an expanded
magnitude range, it produces radically different outcomes from Gaussian distribution
phenomena [59]. Many sophisticated organizational, social, and financial models based on
and around the Gaussian distribution experience frequent breakdowns [60], whereas the
Pareto distribution is much more suitable [59]. The current model deals with the ostracism
risk, and therefore the use of the Pareto distribution is well justified.
In the case generally described by the ordinary Pareto distribution (type I), the prob-
ability that the random variable X is greater than a given number X is calculated by the
respective survival function [59]. When the random variable X is demarcated in both ends
(as in the current model), meeting not only a lower limit Xm > 0 (the minimum possible
value of X), but also an upper limit Xu (0 < Xm ≤ X ≤ Xu), the special case of the bounded
Pareto distribution, as in Equation (1), should be used [59]:
F(x) = Pr(x < X ≤ xu) =

xαm ·x−α−( xmxu )
α
1−( xmxu )
α , xm ≤ x ≤ xu
1, x < xm&x > xu
 (1)
where α ∈ R is the scale parameter known as the Pareto index.
In the current modelling case, the lowermost limit is Xm = 24 (the collective benefits of
S4, S7, S26, and S29), the upper limit is Xu = 35 (the collective benefits of S1, S9 and S24), and
the base value is X = 30 (corresponding to a conditional benefit case of (6,6,6,6,6)). As noted
in the previous section, all interactions among the agents are defined so as no collective
benefit can be at least equal to 30 when there is even 1 individual benefit that is less than
6 on the P scale. The Pareto index is defined as α = log4 (5) = 1.161, as derived from the
Lorenz curve formula L(F) resolved for the 80-20 rule percentages [59,61].
Considering the above, the probability of a collective organizational benefit≥30 which
is, therefore, close to the optimal 80% of the maximum benefit (corresponding to the sum
of the extreme conditional benefit case (9,9,9,9,9)), is calculated in Equation (2):
F(x) = Pr(30 < X ≤ 35) =









)1.161 = 0.35655 ≈ 35.66% (2)
This means that although the cooperative strategic cases are proportionally less than
20% of the total amount, the possibility that such a case will happen is 35.66%.
Sticking to the 80-20 rule and α = 1.161, when changing Xm, X, and Xu, respectively,
the above results will also change. Certain computational tests were conducted for the
probability trends to be ascertained:
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• When all three Xm, X, and Xu increase (decrease), F(X) increases (decreases) as well.
• When Xm increases (decreases) and X, Xu remain stable, F(X) increases (decreases) as
well. If the lower limit increases to the point where it is equal to X, then F(X) = 100%.
On the contrary, if it decreases to 5 × 1 = 5 of the conditional benefit case (1,1,1,1,1),
then F(X) < 2.3%.
• When Xu increases (decreases) and Xm, X, remain stable, F(X) increases (decreases) as
well. If the upper limit decreases to be equal to X, then F(X) = 0%. On the contrary, if
it increases up to 5 × 9 = 45 of the conditional benefit case (9,9,9,9,9), then F(X) > 55%.
• When X increases (decreases) and Xm, Xu remain stable, F(X) inversely decreases
(increases). If X = Xm, then F(X) = 100%. On the contrary, if X = Xu, then F(X) = 0%.
• When two out of three indexes are similarly varied and the third remains stable or is
varied inversely to them, no general rule for the probability trends can be manifested,
and each case should be tested individually.
The most benefited agent in the field of optimal cases is indeed OC, a result consistent
with a professional bureaucratic organization following a generous consultant Likert model.
In the rest of the cases, OC is variously benefited, but still influences greatly the rest of the
agents’ benefits.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper investigates methodologically the probability of organizational cooperation
during decision-making under risk, considering the maximization of individual, group
and collective benefits, and the minimization of the, hereby introduced, ostracism risk.
The ostracism risk is defined as the risk accruing from the lack of satisfaction of possibly
underprivileged constituent personnel components during the process of the decision-
making. For the current investigation, an exemplar reference organization (in the form
of an “ideal type” private construction company) was modelled via game theory, with
its organizational aspects emanating from organizational and HRM theories. The results
taken from the said modelling was probabilistically processed using the bounded Pareto
distribution. Thus, the probability of the adoption of a favorable and cooperational solution
was estimated.
The proposed model is, up to this point, the only found in the relevant literature that
incorporates a probabilistic process of the results taken from a devised game theory analysis
of the ostracism risk. Specifically, the model measures the probability of decision-making
that generally favors both individual and collective organizational benefits. The principal
finding of the model is that such a satisfactory outcome is quite probable if the constituent
organizational groups largely cooperate and assume full responsibility of their choices.
Both preconditions meet the requirements of current organizational and HRM theories—
however, such findings and preconditions do show implications when it comes to their
relation to previous research. The studied literature has not included any succinct findings
of tangible relations (in the form of quantified results) between the existence or lack of the
ostracism risk and organizational effects. While this might be expected for a notion (i.e.,
“ostracism risk”) that is introduced for the first time in this context (i.e., organizational
theory with application in the construction industry), other research efforts on similar
topics that were reviewed also lacked such evidence. Nonetheless, conceptual and method-
ological models—by nature—do not apply to specific conditions but represent general
structures aiming at providing insights and handling tools for dealing with specific issues
of interest. As such, by choosing a well-established and concretely validated organizational
model (i.e., Mintzberg’s) that generally applies to all types of organizations (including
construction companies) as the basis for the proposed methodological framework, it can
be considered that the current study can be well-contextualized in the relevant themes of
previous research.
Given the study’s methodological and theoretical framework, as well as the concep-
tualization and modelling of the exemplar reference construction company (of an “ideal
type”), it can be considered that the proposed approach, upon application, can potentially
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benefit a construction firm featuring attributes similar or adjacent to those of the modelled
reference company—i.e., a private, for-profit medium-sized organization, mainly based on
its operating core. While the conceptual characteristics described within the present paper
are, in themselves, ideal (as the “ideal type” characterization implies), a large number
of real construction companies can broadly approach those characteristics in several real
contexts. As an example of a case in point, in the context of Sweden, the vast majority of
the 177,367 enterprises in the broad construction sector (as of 2019) are considered to be
private SMEs [62], a subset of which are medium-sized companies. As such, in this context
and other similar contexts, there is a large potential that the results of the current study can
resonate with and provide benefits to a plethora of construction firms.
When it comes to what such benefits actually entail, it is clearly derived from the
methodological and theoretical conceptions of the current effort that cooperation in decision-
making across organizational groups and levels throughout the corporate structure is
beneficial—also for the case of construction companies. This study verifies a methodologi-
cal framework that upon conclusion of the steps required for improvements and validation
will apply to any construction company to support and promote the utility of such a
cooperation through its game theoretic and probabilistic modelling, which strives towards
the minimization of the so-called “ostracism risk”. As such, it can be considered that the
proposed methodology can provide benefits to company strategists with regard to the
planning of group decision-making processes, as well as the devising of corporate strategic
responses to critical situations under risk. For example, a company’s strategic responses
against the COVID-19 pandemic crisis are considered in [41] to either reflect retrenchment,
perseverance, innovation, or exit—all of which are crucially affected by factors related to
(group) decision-making.
The limitations of the current study mainly point to the way the 9-point benefit scale
P was defined to depict the satisfaction levels of the game agents during the decision-
making under risk, as well as the modelling following an “ideal type” conceptualization
not corroborated by real data.
When it comes to the benefit scale, the benefit levels are in line with the defined
theoretical framework, consider both quantitative and qualitative criteria, and were ap-
pointed after detailed deductions; however, a more robust scale definition by utilizing
actual organizational databases, bibliographical examples, and/or case studies (e.g., inter-
connections between certain decisions of the board of directors and the amount of medium-
and long-term employee complaints), can be proposed as future work. Nonetheless, such
organizational databases are hard to find. Moreover, it should be noted that in the relative
research field, the corresponding procedure in scale definitions is quite arbitrary and the
justification rudimentary.
When it comes to the modelling, certain improvements can be recommended as future
work, such as: (a) the creation of organizational databases, concerning past events in
real-life enterprises, to be quantified and used as input data for the validation of the model,
(b) the utilization of unexploited game theory elements, such as the iterated elimination
of dominated strategies (IEDS), possible Nash equilibria, and utility measures, for the
production of secondary but still useful results, (c) the utilization of other game types, such
as the dynamic or sequential games (rounds of negotiations between the agents, or cost
parleys), (d) the calibration and adaptation of P, processing statistical data (e.g., employee
preferences and aspirations, or other relative organizational and corporate aspects) with
utility functions, or by combining game theory with real options analysis (ROA) and AHP
(Analytical Hierarchy Process), (e) the modification of the minimum acceptable collective
benefit by including individual benefits that may not be even modestly satisfactory, and (f)
possibly utilizing different probability distribution functions.
The model can be generalized and applied on all kinds of construction companies,
provided that the organizational parameters and, particularly, the group decision-making
process are properly defined. The use of game theory depends on the basic assumptions
of the rest of the utilized theoretical frameworks. In the generalized case, certain game
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theory aspects (such as the number of the agents and the appointed benefits) are mod-
ified according to the initial theoretical framework of the model. The validation of the
proposed methodology can be investigated through the application of the same evaluation
criteria that apply to known group decision-making techniques. Examples of such crite-
ria are applicability, efficiency, fairness, member satisfaction and morale, and leadership
effectiveness.
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